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G. FRED METOS #2250 
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
175 East Fourth South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
LOUIE E. SIMS, : Case No. 900324 
Petitioner/Appellant, : OPENING BRIEF 
OF PETITIONER 
v. : 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE : 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16 
(1953 as amended). This court has appellate jurisdiction in this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1953 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is a petition for review of administrative action 
of the Utah State Tax Commission in affirming the tax and penalty 
assessed against petitioner for his failure to comply with Utah 
Code Annotated §59-37-101 et. seg. (1953 as amended), the Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Does the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah apply to proceedings involving the illegal 
drug stamp tax act before the Utah State Tax Commission? 
Did the roadblock stop of petitioner's vehicle, which 
resulted in the discovery of controlled substances, violate 
petitioner's right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable 
searches and seizures as described in Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
Did that same roadblock stop violate petitioner's right 
to be free from warrantless and unreasonable searches and 
seizures as described in the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution? 
Was the consent to search petitioner's vehicle gained 
as a result of the initial illegal roadblock stop. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The rights of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated §41-1-17(a) through (d) (1953 as 
amended): 
The Commission , and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall 
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen, 
and others duly authorized by the department 
or by law shall have power and it shall be 
their duty: 
(a) To enforce the provision of this 
act and all of the laws regulating the 
registration or operation of vehicles or the 
use of the highways. 
(b) To make arrests upon view and 
without warrant to any violation committed in 
their presence of any of the provisions of 
this act or other law regulating the 
operation of vehicles or the use of the 
highways. 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable 
belief that any vehicle is being operated in 
violation of any provision of this act or of 
any other law regulating the operation of 
vehicles to require the driver thereof to 
stop, exhibit his driver's license and submit 
to an inspection of such vehicle, the 
registration plates and registration card 
thereon. 
(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type 
required to be registered hereunder in any 
public garage or repair shop or in any place 
where such vehicles are held for sale or 
wrecking, for the purpose of locating stolen 
vehicles and investigating the title and 
registration thereof. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended): 
"The Commission" refers to the State Tax Commission, Utah Code 
Annotated §41-1-1(d) (1953 as amended). 
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A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-102(2) (1953 as amended): 
"Dealer" means a person, who in 
violation of Utah law, manufactures, 
produces, ships, transports, or imports into 
Utah or in any manner acquires or possesses 
more than 421* grams of marihuana, or seven or 
more grams of any controlled substance, or 
ten or more dosage unites of any controlled 
substance which is not sold by weight. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-104(2) (1953 as amended): 
A dealer may not possess any marihuana 
or controlled substance upon which a tax is 
imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has 
been paid on the marihuana or other 
controlled substance as evidenced by a stamp 
or other official indicia. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1) and (6) (1953 as 
amended): 
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, 
transports, or imports into this state 
marihuana or controlled substances, he shall 
permanently affix the official indicia on the 
marijuana or controlled substances evidencing 
the payment of the tax required under this 
chapter. A stamp or other official indicia 
may not be used more than once. 
(6) (a) The commission shall collect 
all taxes imposed under this chapter. 
Amounts collected under this chapter, 
whether characterized as taxes, 
interest, or penalties, shall be 
deposited in the Drug Stamp Tax Fund as 
a dedicated credit and shall be applied 
and distributed under Section 68-38-9 of 
the Budgetary Procedures Act as follows: 
(i) forty percent to the 
commission for administrative costs 
of recovery; and 
(ii) sixty percent to the law 
enforcement agency conducting the 
controlled substance investigation, 
to be used and applied by the 
agency in the continued enforcement 
of controlled substance laws. 
(b) If there is more than one 
participating law enforcement agency, 
the 60% under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) 
shall be divided equitably and 
distributed among the agencies by the 
administrative law judge conducting the 
hearing to determine taxpayer liability. 
The distribution shall be based upon the 
extent of agency participation as 
appears from evidence submitted by each 
agency relative to actual time and 
expense incurred in the investigation. 
(c) If no law enforcement agency 
is involved in the collection of a 
specific amount under this chapter, the 
entire amount collected shall be applied 
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) to 
administrative costs of recovery. 
(7) (a) If property in kind obtained 
from the taxpayer is of use or benefit 
to the commission in the enforcement of 
this chapter or is of use or benefit to 
the participating law enforcement agency 
in the continued enforcement of 
controlled substance laws, either the 
commission or the law enforcement agency 
may apply to the administrative law 
judge for the award of the property. If 
the administrative law judge finds the 
property is of use or benefit either to 
the commission or the law enforcement 
agency,the property shall be awarded 
accordingly. 
(b) Before an award under this 
subsection is ordered, the property 
shall be appraised by a court appointed 
appraiser and the appraised value shall 
be credited to the taxpayer. If the 
taxpayer objects to the results of the 
court-appointed appraisal, he may obtain 
his own appraisal at his own expense 
within ten days of the court-appointed 
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appraisal. The decision of the 
administrative law judge as to value is 
controlling. 
(c) The value of any property in 
kind awarded to the commission or to the 
participating law enforcement agency 
shall be counted as a portion of its 
percentage share under Subsection (6). 
(8) Property of the taxpayer otherwise 
subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13 
is not affected by this chapter if there is 
compliance with Section 58-37-13 regarding 
the forfeiture and the proceeds and property 
seized and forfeited are accordingly divided 
and distributed. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106 (1953 as amended): 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter 
is subject to a penalty of 100% of the tax in 
addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-
103. The penalty shall be collected as part 
of the tax. 
(2) In addition to the tax penalty 
imposed, a dealer distributing or possessing 
marijuana or controlled substances without 
affixing the appropriate stamps, labels, or 
other indicia is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) An information, indictment, or 
complaint may be filed upon any criminal 
offense under this chapter within six years 
after the commission of the offense. This 
subsection supersedes any provisions to the 
contrary. 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by 
the commission are presumed to be valid and 
correct. The burden is on the taxpayer to 
show their incorrectness or invalidity. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 30, 1988 petitioner was served with a notice 
and demand for payment of illegal drug stamp tax and penalty. 
(R. 257-258) The tax related to the seizure of 985 grams of 
cocaine and 106 grams of marijuana from petitioner's vehicle on 
July 27, 1988. (R. 258) Petitioner filed a petition for 
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redetermination (R. 32) and an amended petition for 
redetermination. (R. 41) Among the issues raised by petitioner 
was the legality of the roadblock search of his vehicle. (R. 42-
43) After a proceeding before a hearing officer, the Utah State 
Tax Commission entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Final Decision. (R. 8-12) The Commission did not address the 
merits of the issue of the search of petitioner's vehicle. 
Rather, the Commission found that the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution does not apply to 
proceedings involving the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act before the 
Utah State Tax Commission. (R. 11-12) 
Petitioner was also charged by information with the 
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(1953 as amended). Prior to trial, a motion to suppress the 
evidence was made. Petitioner alleged that evidence was seized 
in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That 
motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. (R. 246-254) 
Petitioner requested that the trial court reconsider its ruling 
as that court had not specifically addressed the issues relating 
to the Utah Constitution. That motion was also denied. (R. 255-
256) Petitioner waived his right to trial by jury and the case 
was tried to the trial judge based upon stipulated facts. These 
facts included the evidence admitted at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress. Petitioner was convicted as charged. The appeal of 
that judgment and commitment is currently pending before the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Case Number 890463 CA. 
On Wednesday, July 27, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol 
Troopers and sheriff deputies from Utah and Juab County conducted 
a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab County. (R. 151, 193) The 
purpose of the roadblock was to detect criminal, motor vehicle 
registration, equipment and driver's license violations. (R. 
151, 165, 196) The roadblock was located between mile posts 220 
and 222 on Interstate 15, about two miles south of Nephi, Utah. 
(R. 151, 166) The roadblock was conducted under the supervision 
of Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol. (R. 192-
193) Sergeant Mangelson had received verbal permission to 
conduct the roadblock from his immediate superior, Lieutenant 
James Utley. No evidence was introduced by the State to indicate 
why that particular time, date or location was selected for the 
roadblock. 
Notice that the roadblock would be conducted was 
announced in the Juab County Times News. That was published two 
to four weeks prior to July 27, 1988. (R. 152, 179) A patrolman 
assigned to the roadblock testified that he was unsure if that 
particular newspaper was distributed outside of Juab County. (R. 
179) Interstate 15 is the primary north-south highway in Utah 
and is also the primary route of motor vehicle travel from Salt 
Lake City to Los Angeles, California. (R. 179) There was no 
indication that the Juab County Times News would be available to 
the majority of the people who would be subject to the roadblock. 
Motorists driving on the interstate were given notice 
of the roadblock by three signs. (R. 152, 194, 201-202) Those 
signs were about four feet square, orange in color with black 
lettering. (R. 194) The first sign was placed within one-half 
mile of the roadblock (R. 201) and pictured a silhouette of a 
flagman. (R. 194, 201) The second sign was about two hundred 
yards from the roadblock (R. 201) and read "Prepare to Stop." 
(R. 194, 201) The last sign was right at the roadblock (R. 201) 
and read "All Vehicles Must Stop." (R. 194, 202) Sergeant 
Mangelson testified that all of these signs were similar to signs 
used at road construction zones. (R. 200) None of the signs 
indicated that motorists were to be detained by law enforcement 
agents at a roadblock. (R. 201) The speed limit in this area is 
posted at 65 miles per hour. (R. 166) A motorist travelling at 
or around the speed limit would be given less than one-half 
minute of notice before being stopped and detained. 
After the third sign, cones were set in the roadway 
directing the traffic to the right. (R. 194) About ten officers 
were in position to receive the vehicles. (R. 194) Sergeant 
Mangelson gave verbal instructions to each of the officers as 
they arrived. (R. 162, 202) Mangelson testified that he had 
never received any written memorandum or policies for conducting 
roadblocks from either the Utah Highway Patrol or the State 
Department of Public Safety. (R. 206-207) In describing the 
only instructions he received, Sergeant Mangelson testified, "I 
was told the signs met the regulation." (R. 207) 
Sergeant Mangelson also testified that he instructed 
the officers manning the roadblock that they were to look for 
driver's license, liquor and drug violations. (R. 203) He also 
told them not to stop any large trucks. (R. 203) Initially, the 
officers were to inspect drivers' licenses and vehicle 
registrations. If the officers noticed anything that they may 
consider to be unusual, they had the discretion to have the 
driver pull over so that further investigation could be 
conducted. (R. 208-209) Trooper Carl Howard, who worked at this 
roadblock, testified that if he noticed a problem while 
inspecting the registration and driver's license it was within 
his discretion to determine if a motorist should be further 
detained or allowed to leave. (R. 173) The trooper also 
indicated it was within his discretion to determine what 
investigative procedures could be taken. (R. 173) Officers had 
the discretion to interview the motorists, radio the dispatcher 
to run a warrants or stolen vehicle check, or request to search 
the vehicle. (R. 170-175) 
At about 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1988, petitioner was 
stopped at the roadblock. (R. 153) Other than the roadblock, 
the troopers had no articulable suspicion or reason to believe 
that petitioner was involved in the commission of any crime. (R. 
176-177) Trooper Howard initially contacted the defendant and 
requested to inspect petitioner's driver's license and 
registration. (R. 154) Petitioner produced a Georgia State 
driver's license and vehicle registration that indicated he 
resided in Utah, (R. 154) At that time, Trooper Howard detected 
an odor of alcohol inside the vehicle and on petitioner's breath. 
(R. 154) Trooper Howard also noticed an open bottle of liquor on 
the rear seat. (R. 154) The trooper asked petitioner about the 
odor of alcohol and petitioner indicated that he had not been 
drinking that morning, but had been drinking the previous night. 
(R. 155) Trooper Howard requested that the petitioner and the 
passenger, Dorsey Thompson, exit the vehicle. (R. 156) They 
complied with this request. The trooper then requested 
permission to search the vehicle and petitioner acquiesced. (R. 
156) Trooper Howard searched the driver's side of the vehicle 
and Mangelson searched the passenger side. (R. 156-157, 196) 
During the search of the ashtray located in the rear 
passenger side door of the vehicle, Mangelson discovered remnants 
of marijuana cigarettes. (R. 158, 184, 196) Trooper Howard then 
instructed petitioner to open the trunk of the vehicle and 
petitioner complied. (R. 158) Numerous items were removed. A 
briefcase and suitcase were opened and searched. Relatively 
small bags of marijuana were located in those containers. (R. 
159, 198) Trooper Howard had previously requested that 
petitioner perform field sobriety tests. Those tests were 
conducted as Mangelson searched the trunk of petitioner's 
vehicle. (R. 159, 185-186, 197) 
During those tests, petitioner requested that Mangelson 
stop searching the vehicle. (R. 186, 199) Mangelson responded, 
stating that based on the discovery of the marijuana in the 
ashtray, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle. (R. 
187f 205) Eventually, Mangelson located a package in the spare 
tire compartment of the trunk. The package was in a plastic sack 
and covered with wrapping paper. On the outside, the word 
"Toyota" was written in large letters. The package was found to 
contain approximately one kilogram of cocaine. (R. 197) 
Petitioner and Thompson were then arrested and booked into the 
Juab County jail. (R. 162) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The exclusionary rules of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution are applicable to proceedings before the Utah State 
Tax Commission involving the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax. The 
purposes of the exclusionary rule are advanced by applying it to 
such proceedings. This is because the arresting agency stands to 
reap substantial material gains if the rule is not applied to 
proceedings involving the illegal drug stamp tax. Furthermore, 
such proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Consequently, the 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule outweighs the cost to 
society in applying it to Illegal Drug Stamp Tax proceedings. 
The stop of petitioner at the Juab County roadblock 
violated his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable 
searches and seizures as described in Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. The officers had no statutory 
authority to stop petitioner. The officers lacked any 
individualized suspicion that petitioner had committed any 
criminal offense. The State failed to show that the roadblock 
significantly advanced the public interest in law enforcement and 
that there were less intrusive means available to advance that 
interest. Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of this 
constitutional violation should have been suppressed. 
The stop of petitioner at the Juab County roadblock 
violated his right to be free from warrantless and unreasonable 
searches and seizures as described in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The roadblock in question was 
conducted without authority of law. Furthermore, the procedures 
employed by the officers failed to limit the discretion of those 
officers conducting the roadblock. This was not a sobriety 
checkpoint at a known problem area, but was a multipurpose 
roadblock. The roadblock stop of petitioner was unreasonable, 
thus requiring that the evidence seized be suppressed. 
Any consent that was obtained to search petitioner's 
vehicle was the result of the exploitation of the roadblock 
search. The purported consent was closely related in the time to 
the stop and there were no intervening circumstances between the 
stop and any consent. Consequently, the discovery of evidence 
resulting from petitioner's acquiescence to the trooper's request 
to search is inadmissible in the tax stamp proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TAX COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO APPLY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO 
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP 
TAX ACT. 
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The Tax Commission ruled that the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule was inapplicable to proceedings before that 
body to contest the tax and penalty assessed as a result of 
failing to comply with the illegal drug stamp tax actr Utah Code 
Annotated §59-19-101 et. seq. (1953 as amended). In reaching 
that conclusion, the commission purported to employ the balancing 
test required in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) and 
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). The commission 
concluded that there was no showing that the application of the 
exclusionary rule in tax commission proceedings would meet the 
purposes of that rule. The commission also noted that the 
application of the exclusionary rule to tax commission 
proceedings may result in findings inconsistent with the rulings 
of the district courts hearing the related criminal cases. 
Finally, the commission concluded that the societal interest in 
deterring police conduct did not outweigh the societal interest 
in facilitating the fact finding process. 
The relief sought below was to apply the exclusionary 
rule only to proceedings involving the illegal drug stamp tax 
act. In not limiting its decision to such proceedings the 
commission disregarded the unique penal nature of the tax stamp 
proceedings. The commission also disregarded the statute that 
required local law enforcement to share in the receipts of taxes 
and penalties assessed under the illegal drug stamp tax act. 
In determining if the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule applies to a particular proceeding, the Supreme Court has 
employed a balancing test. In United States v. Janis, supra, the 
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the 
actions of state law enforcement officers in a federal IRS civil 
proceeding. In reaching this conclusion, several factors were 
balanced: the purpose of the exclusionary rule, the type of 
proceeding involved, empirical data on the specific deterrent 
effect of the rule and the negative effect on the fact finding 
process. 
In I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, the balancing test 
from Janis was employed. The court determined that the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied to civil deportation 
proceedings. In reaching that conclusion the Court emphasized 
the nature of the proceeding and the violation that was involved. 
The Court noted that such proceedings were utilized in a high 
volume of immigration cases, most of which were handled by a 
voluntary return to the country of origin. Such cases required a 
simple hearing. The I.N.S. arrests were made by officers who 
specialized in such violations. The officers were given specific 
departmental policies to follow. Finally, with respect to the 
nature of the proceedings, the Court emphasized that deportation 
involved a status offense—being an illegal alien. A dismissal 
of a case on Fourth Amendment grounds and release of the 
defendant allowed him to continue to violate the law. The Court 
concluded that application of the exclusionary rule in civil 
deportation proceedings would have little or no deterrent effect 
on law enforcement officers. The Court also found that the 
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application of the rule in those proceedings would result in a 
substantial cost to society. Consequently, the Court refused to 
employ the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings. 
The final case that addressed this issue is One 1958 
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965). In that 
case the Court held that the exclusionary rule does apply to 
civil forfeiture proceedings. The Court focussed on the nature 
of the proceedings. Forfeiture proceedings were characterized as 
"quasi-criminal" because the object of the proceeding was to 
impose a penalty for the commission of a crime. The court noted 
that it would be anomalous to hold that in a criminal proceeding 
the evidence would be excludable, but in the forfeiture 
proceeding, requiring the determination that the law has been 
violated, the evidence would be admissible. 
To determine whether the exclusionary rule is 
applicable to tax commission proceedings relative to the illegal 
drug stamp tax act, an analysis of the act is necessary. The act 
2 
requires that dealers purchase and affix the illegal drug stamps 
to any marijuana or other controlled substances that are 
possessed , or purchased, acquired, transported or imported into 
the state. A failure to comply with the statute will result in 
z
 "Dealer" is defined, in Utah Code Annotated §59-19-102(2) (1953 
as amended). 
3
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-104(2) (1953 as amended). 
4
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-105(1) (1953 as amended). 
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the imposition of the tax and a 100% penalty. Furthermore, it 
is a felony to violate the act. 
The proceedings before the tax commission enforcing the 
tax stamp assessments and penalties are indistinguishable from 
civil forfeiture proceedings. In the stamp tax proceedings, the 
state must prove that the subject committed a crime. That would 
be either the third degree felony for failing to affix the stamps 
to the controlled substances, or a violation of the controlled 
substances act. There is a substantial tax and a 100% penalty 
involved. In this case, the tax and penalty totalled 
$394,106.00. The maximum fine and assessment for the criminal 
conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
7 8 
distribute is $12,500. This is distinguishable from the 
proceeding in Janis where the issue to be determined was the 
income tax owed on profits of a gambling operation. Likewise, 
these tax stamp proceedings have no similarity to the civil 
deportation proceedings discussed in Lopez-Mendoza. In Lopez-
Mendoza simple proceedings were at issue. Those proceedings were 
to determine an individual's immigration status. The proceedings 
also afforded an illegal alien the opportunity to voluntarily 
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(1) (1953 as amended). 
6
 Utah Code Annotated §59-19-106(2) (1953 as amended). 
7 
A violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-5 (1953 as amended). 
Q 
The maximum fine is $10,000 and a 25% surcharge may be assessed 
on any fine. 
return to his country of origin. Here, the proceedings involve 
proof that a crime had been committed and the propriety of 
substantial monetary penalties based on that proof. 
The next issue is to discuss the deterrent effect that 
the exclusionary rule would have in the tax stamp proceedings. 
The key to the determination of this issue is in Utah Code 
Annotated §59-19-105 (1953 as amended). That statute requires 
that the investigating agency receive sixty percent of the 
proceeds of the taxes and penalties collected or sixty percent of 
the property seized (based on the value of the property) for its 
own use and benefit. If the exclusionary rule did not apply in 
these proceedings, the investigating agency could disregard the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and lose the criminal case 
because the evidence seized is ordered suppressed. However, that 
same agency could still receive substantial monetary benefits as 
a result of the illegal actions of its agents. Such a procedure 
creates a substantial financial incentive to investigative 
agencies to engage in practices that violate the Fourth 
Amendment. The statute has the potential of allowing agencies 
who investigate narcotics violations to receive financing through 
illegal conduct. 
Requiring that tax proceeds be shared with an 
investigative agency distinguishes these illegal drug tax stamp 
proceedings from other proceedings before the tax commission. 
The only other statute that allows the investigating agency to 
share in the proceeds of a seizure is the forfeiture statute. 
As previously noted, the exclusionary rule does apply to 
forfeiture proceedings. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 
supra. There is a substantial deterrent effect in applying the 
exclusionary rule to the illegal drug stamp tax proceedings: it 
prevents investigative agencies from profiting from Fourth 
Amendment violations. The exclusionary rule does undermine the 
fact finding process in these proceedings. However, what is at 
issue is an additional penalty for a violation of the law rather 
than a determination of one's income tax or immigration status. 
The punitive nature of the tax and penalty and the need to 
prevent agencies from receiving financial benefits for Fourth 
Amendment violations outweigh the negative effect on the fact 
finding process. The exclusionary rule should be applied to the 
illegal drug stamp tax proceedings before the state tax 
commission. 
POINT II 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF ROADBLOCKS. ANY 
EVIDENCE SEIZED AT SUCH A STOP MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
This court has expressed concern with the Fourth 
Amendment rulings of the federal courts in vehicle search cases. 
As an alternative, counsel has been encouraged to litigate these 
issues under Article Ir Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
See: Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13(8)(a) (1953 as amended). 
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah, 1986) u In Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983), Justice OfConner encouraged state courts to 
decide search and seizure issues on state constitutional 
provisions rather than resorting to a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Furthermore, two judges of this court have held that Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution provides greater 
protections to individuals than does the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990).n 
In State v. Earl, supraf this court suggested that the 
analysis described in State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985), 
be applied to an interpretation of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. The most appropriate form of analysis to 
apply to the roadblock issue is to look to the rulings of other 
12 
state courts on similar constitutional provisions. This is 
because the texts of both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment are nearly identical. 
However, a number of other states have held that roadblocks are 
unreasonable seizures of the person on state constitutional 
For an extensive discussion of the background of this issue 
see: Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 B.Y.U. 
J. of Pub. Law 357 (1989). 
See footnote 1. 
12 
This is the analysis employed in the plurality opinion in 
State v. Lorocco, supra. 
grounds. There are three basic reasons given by these courts 
for this result: First, law enforcement agents lack statutory 
authority to conduct a roadblock. Second, an individual cannot 
be detained without a showing that the officer has an 
individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed. Third, 
a balancing of the interests involved indicates that roadblock 
stops are unreasonable seizures of the person. 
A. 
THE ROADBLOCK IN THIS CASE WAS CONDUCTED 
WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW. 
Several state appellate courts have specifically 
addressed the need for statutory authority to enable law 
enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock. The Supreme Court of 
Oregon addressed this issue in the context of a civil suit for 
damages by a plaintiff who was stopped at a roadblock, Nelson v. 
Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987). Two other 
criminal cases involving similar roadblocks were addressed by 
that court at that time: State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 
P.2d 711 (Or. 1987), and State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d 
715 (Or. 1987). In Nelson v. Lane County, supra, the state 
sought to uphold the use of a roadblock on the basis that such a 
seizure was constitutionally authorized. 
In Nelson, the state maintained that it had statutory 
authority to conduct a roadblock under a general statute that 
See Points II A, B and C, infra. 
gave law enforcement agencies the authority to enforce the 
criminal law. The state claimed that the statute implicitly 
authorized roadblocks and that the roadblock in question was 
conducted in accordance with "The Oregon State Police Patrol 
Manual." In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned, 
By and large, agencies of the executive 
branch are free to carry out their assigned 
responsibilities in ways of their own 
choosing. Making explicit the manner in 
which any agency is to accomplish its task 
falls to the agency head or that official's 
designee to instruct or sub-delegate to 
subordinated officials. 
However, some procedures may invade the 
personal freedoms protected from government 
interference by the constitution. Roadblocks 
are seizures of the person, possibly to be 
followed by a search of the person or the 
person's effects. For this reason, the 
authority to conduct roadblocks cannot be 
implied. Before they search or seize, 
executive agencies must have explicit 
authority from outside the executive branch. 
743 P.2d at 695. 
Similarly, in State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 
P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988), the Supreme Court of Idaho held that its 
constitutional provision prohibiting warrantless and unreasonable 
searches and seizures required express legislative authority to 
conduct a roadblock. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
found roadblocks to be unreasonable under similar provisions of 
the Oklahoma Constitution. One of the bases for that court's 
decision was that officers lacked statutory authority to make 
such stops. State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1984). 
In Utah there is no express statutory authority that 
allows law enforcement agents to conduct a roadblock. Before a 
vehicle may be stopped to investigate a violation of the motor 
vehicle code, the Utah statute specifically requires an officer 
to have a reasonable belief that there has been a violation of 
the law.14 To conduct a seizure of the person to investigate 
for any other criminal violation, the Utah statute mandates that 
the officer have at the very least a reasonable suspicion that a 
crime has been committed.15 In this case, vehicles were stopped 
on the interstate. The only reason for the stop was that the 
vehicles were using that roadway. There is no statutory 
authority that allows law enforcement agents to employ such a 
procedure. Due to the lack of legal authority, the stop of 
appellant's vehicle and resulting search were unreasonable. The 
stop and search in this case violates Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
B. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH REQUIRES INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION TO 
JUSTIFY A SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PERSON. 
x
 Utah Code Annotated §41-l-17(c) (1953 as amended). 
1 5
 Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops, supra, also 
concludes that there is no legal authority in Utah to conduct 
roadblock stops. A roadblock stop, the authors further conclude, 
would be unconstitutional. 
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In Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221 (Pa. Super. 
1985), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed the propriety 
of roadblock stops under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The 
Pennsylvania legislature had previously enacted a statute 
allowing law enforcement agencies to utilize roadblock stops for 
the purpose of checking vehicles, drivers or documents. The 
defendant in Tarbert had been convicted of driving under the 
influence as a result of a roadblock stop. The court reviewed 
the cases upholding the constitutionality of roadblocks. The 
court then noted: 
Courts upholding the constitutionality of 
roadblocks are not unmindful of their 
intrusivenessf but rather, stress that 
careful control and absence of discretion can 
bring the use of the roadblock within the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Commonwealth v. Tarbert, supra, at 225. With respect to this 
reasoning the court then held: 
While the arguments supporting the 
constitutionality of systematic roadblocks 
are persuasive, the rationale supporting them 
is flawed. No amount of control or limited 
discretion can justify the "seizure" that 
takes place in the complete absence of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a 
motor vehicle violation has occurred. 
Certainly, the Constitution of our 
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right 
to be free from intrusions where one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
lb. at 225-226. The court ultimately held that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution is violated when roadblock stops are based on 
neither probable cause nor a reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been committed. 
The holding in State v. Henderson, supra, has 
previously been discussed with respect to the effect of the lack 
of statutory authority to conduct a roadblock. The Idaho Supreme 
Court went further and held that under the Idaho Constitution, 
law enforcement officers are required to have individualized 
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before a stop of a vehicle may 
be made. The Supreme Court of Oregon reached the same conclusion 
in State v. Boyanovsky, supra. That case was the companion case 
to Nelson v. Lane County, supra. It addressed a roadblock search 
resulting in a criminal conviction rather than a civil action 
against law enforcement authorities. The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana also concluded that there was a need for individualized 
suspicion to invade one's privacy under that state's 
constitution. Consequently, a roadblock stop was held to be 
unconstitutional in Louisiana. State v. Parms, 523 So.2d 1293 
(La. 1988). 
By statute, officers in Utah are required to have 
individualized suspicion of criminal activity before violating a 
17 
citizen's privacy interest. Both the Utah Supreme Court and 
the court of appeals have required such individualized suspicion 
in addressing Fourth Amendment issues; State v. Mendoza, 748 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988). The same requirement for individualized suspicion was 
found to be applicable to Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution in State v. Larocco, supra. 
17 
See discussion in Point I, A., supra. 
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In Larocco, the court addressed the issue of whether 
the inspection of a vehicle identification number (VIN) violated 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah. The court of appeals held that the opening 
of the vehicle door to look at the VIN did not implicate any 
Fourth Amendment interests. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). On certiorari, Justice Durham authored an 
opinion that was joined by Justice Zimmerman. In that opinion, 
Justice Durham found that the VIN inspection violated Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In Larocco, Justice Durham held that Article I, Section 
14 of the Constitution of Utah required the State to show that 
there was both probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless vehicle search. The basis of this holding 
was a need to simplify the rules regarding warrantless vehicle 
stops. Justice Durham reviewed the Supreme Court's Fourth 
Amendment rulings on such stops and found them to be 
inconsistent. The inconsistencies were noted to be a result of 
the Courtfs misapplication of the doctrine relating to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy as it affected the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Justice Durham noted that the expectation of privacy 
doctrine was originally employed to determine standing (if the 
Fourth Amendment was implicated in a search or seizure). 
However, in recent cases the Supreme Court has used the level of 
the claimant's expectation of privacy to determine if a warrant 
is required. This has resulted in the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment improperly being read as part of the 
reasonableness clause of that amendment. In Larocco, Justice 
Durham's position was that the question of the privacy interest 
is a threshold issue to determine if Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution is implicated. 
Justice Durham then found that Article I, Section 14 
contains two separate requirements and both must be satisfied to 
find a warrantless search valid. There must be a showing that 
the search was reasonable (based on probable cause). There must 
also be a showing that a warrant was obtained or there were 
exigent circumstances that prevented the officers from obtaining 
a warrant. With respect to exigent circumstances, Justice Durham 
stated ". . .warrantless searches will be permitted only where 
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect 
the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction 
of evidence." 794 P.2d at 469-470. 
In Larocco, Justice Durham found that the officers had 
probable cause to believe the vehicle in question was stolen. 
However, there were no exigent circumstances to justify the 
warrantless opening of the vehicle door to check the VIN. With 
roadblocks, there is neither a warrant, exigent circumstances, 
nor individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed. 
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), and California v. 
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
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Consequently, a roadblock stop fails to meet both requirements of 
Justice Durham's Larocco standard. On this basis, the roadblock 
stop violates Article If Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
This conclusion is reinforced when the rationale used 
to justify a roadblock is considered. In Michigan Department of 
Public Safety v. Sitz, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), a 
balancing test was employed to determine if a sobriety roadblock 
violated the Fourth Amendment. The State's interest is balanced 
against the effectiveness of the action taken to achieve that 
interest and the intrusion to an individual's privacy. This 
reasoning was expressly rejected in Larocco because the 
requirements of the warrant clause must be met. Furthermore, 
Sitz would involve a misapplication of the analysis of privacy 
interests as interpreted in Article I, Section 14. 
In this case Trooper Howard testified that the only 
reason for the stop of petitioner's vehicle was the roadblock. 
The trooper candidly admitted that there was no probable cause to 
believe that petitioner was engaged in any criminal conduct prior 
to the stop. Likewise, the trooper also admitted that he could 
not articulate any facts or circumstances to indicate that 
petitioner was involved in any criminal conduct prior to the 
stop. For this reason, the stop of petitioner's vehicle violated 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
C. 
A BALANCING OF INTERESTS RESULTS IN THE 
CONCLUSION THAT THE ROADBLOCK STOP IN THIS 
CASE WAS UNREASONABLE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE 
STOP VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
In determining the reasonableness of police action in 
relation to an interference with a privacy interest courts may 
apply a balancing test. State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 
1985). In that case the propriety of a roadblock to investigate 
drunk driving under the New Hampshire Constitution was addressed. 
The court required that the following test be met: 
To justify the search or seizure of a motor 
vehicle, absent probable cause or even a 
reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense 
is being committed, the State must prove that 
its conduct significantly advances the public 
interest in a manner that outweighs the 
accompanying intrusion on individual rights. 
It must further prove that no less intrusive 
means are available to accomplish the State's 
goals. 
499 A.2d at 981. 
In applying that test, the court held that a roadblock 
is not an effective means of detecting or deterring drunk 
driving. The court described the significant number of vehicles 
stopped, the number of officers deployed at the roadblock and the 
very few arrests that were actually made. The court concluded 
that the public interest in deterring drunk driving offenses was 
not significantly outweighed by the intrusions caused by a 
roadblock. This is because the court found from the statistics 
introduced at trial that highly visible roving patrols made more 
arrests than were effected at the roadblock. The patrols 
involved about the same number of officers as were deployed at 
the roadblock. Consequently, such patrols provided a less 
intrusive means to accomplish the State's goals. 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho reached the same conclusion 
in State v. Henderson, supra. In that case the evidence 
indicated that officers on patrol would make more arrests than 
that number of officers deployed at a roadblock. The court 
concluded: 
Thus, the testimony of the two police 
officials most responsible for the roadblock 
show unequivocally that these warrantless 
searches conducted without any suspicion of 
criminal wrongdoing are less efficient than 
the normal stops based on probable cause. 
Therefore, roadblocks are an inefficient and 
unnecessary constraint on a person's right to 
remain free of search or seizure absent 
probable cause. 
[emphasis in the original] 756 P.2d at 1061. 
In this case, there was no evidence introduced that 
would demonstrate the effectiveness of a roadblock as opposed to 
other less intrusive means of investigation. However, the 
conclusion that can be reached from the case law is that 
roadblocks are not an effective means of law enforcement. The 
roadblock is not an efficient use of police manpower. Likewise, 
a roadblock creates a highly intrusive and inconvenient situation 
19 for the travelling public. For these reasons, a roadblock 
does not pass the balancing test employed by other state courts 
to determine the reasonableness of a stop that is based on 
iy
 See also, State v. Barcia, 549 A.2d 491 (N.J. Super. 1988) 
where a roadblock on the New Jersey side of the George Washington 
bridge caused a traffic jam in New York City involving over one 
million of motor vehicles, and taking over four hours to unravel. 
The Court described the situation as a "traffic morass of 
monumental proportions." 549 A.2d 497. 
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity. The State failed to produce any evidence tending to 
show how effective this particular roadblock was. The state 
cannot meet the requirements of the balancing test employed in 
Henderson and Koppel. The only conclusion that can be reached is 
that the roadblock stop of appellant was unreasonable and thus 
violated Article Ir Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
D. 
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE SEIZED IS THE PROPER 
REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 
14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Larocco, supra. Justice Durham held in her 
plurality opinion that there are some eighteen states that have 
found that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of their 
20 
respective state search and seizure provisions. Based on the 
actions of these courts and the application of the exclusionary 
rule to Fourth Amendment violations, Justices Durham and 
Zimmerman held that violations of Article I, Section 14 require 
application of the exclusionary rule. With respect to illegal 
drug tax stamp proceedings, a balancing of the interests requires 
21 the application of the exclusionary rule. 
The evidence that was seized in the stop at issue in 
this case, one kilogram of cocaine, was the only evidence that 
established the tax and penalty assessed by the tax commission. 
20 
See State v. Larocco, supra, at 472 fn. 3. 
21 
See Point I, supra. 
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The officers1 violation of petitioner's right to be free from 
warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures as described 
in Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah requires 
suppression of the cocaine which was seized. This would require 
that the petitioner's liability for the tax and penalty resulting 
from the violation of the illegal drug stamp tax act be 
discharged, 
POINT III 
A ROADBLOCK FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF CRIME 
DETECTION VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 
the Supreme Court held that the use of a sobriety checkpoint or 
roadblock to curb the problem of drunk driving on the highways 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In determining that such 
roadblocks do not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
employed the balancing test described in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47 (1979). Brown requires courts to balance the state's 
interests against both the effectiveness of the state's action in 
achieving that interest and the intrusion on the individual's 
privacy. 
In applying this balancing test to the sobriety 
checkpoint in Sitz, the Court gave substantial weight to the 
problem of drunk driving in this country and the carnage that has 
resulted from the alcohol related traffic accidents. The 
roadblock in Sitz was established in accordance with guidelines 
promulgated by a "Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee.1' The 
guidelines set procedures governing checkpoint operations, site 
selection and publicity. The committee was comprised of 
representatives of state and local police, prosecutors and the 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute. 
The roadblock at issue in this case was not limited to 
one particular state interest that was a substantial public 
problem, such as drunk driving. Sergeant Mangelson testified 
that the purpose of the roadblock was to detect any criminal or 
traffic violation. The time and place of the roadblock were not 
governed by any guidelines to limit the potential interference 
with travelers. There was virtually no notice to the traveling 
public that they may be involved in a roadblock. The only 
publicity of the roadblock was given in a Juab County newspaper. 
The signs gave no notice that motorists were entering a law 
enforcement roadblock. At this roadblock, the officers had 
unlimited discretion in the investigative actions they deemed to 
be appropriate. 
In Sitz the drunk driving problem was balanced against 
the effectiveness of the roadblock procedure and the nature of 
the Fourth Amendment intrusion. The Court focused on the minimal 
objective intrusion to law abiding citizens caused at the 
roadblock. In doing so, the Court rejected the Michigan court's 
emphasis on the roadblock's subjective intrusion caused to 
motorists. The Court then noted that the analysis of the degree 
to which the seizure advances the public interest "was not meant 
to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts 
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the decision as to which among reasonable law enforcement 
techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public 
danger." id. at 2483. The court found that the checkpoint 
resulted in the DUI arrests of 1.5 percent of the drivers 
stopped. This was greater than the percentage of arrests made at 
the permanent border checkpoint that was upheld in United States 
v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
The nature of the stop and length of the intrusion for 
the general motoring public involved in the roadblock at issue in 
the instant case was significant. However, there was no 
particular reason to establish that roadblock. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the intrusion cannot be factored into the 
balancing equation. The only factor that carries any weight is 
the Fourth Amendment intrusion. Therefore, in balancing the 
interests in this case, the only conclusion that can be reached 
is that the Fourth Amendment was violated. When an intrusion is 
not made to solve a particular and significant law enforcement 
concern, the stop is indistinguishable from that conducted in 
22 
Brown v. Texas, supra. Such a stop is also closely analogous 
to the roving random vehicle stops for traffic violations which 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 684 (1979), prohibited. 
The Court in Sitz did not allow roadblocks to be used 
for general crime detection. The Court held that a very 
22 
In that case a statute that required individuals to provide 
police officers with identification when stopped was found to 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
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substantial problem of drunk driving justified the minimal 
intrusion of the roadblock. In this case, the general need to 
detect crime cannot be used to justify seizures that are not 
based on any showing of individualized suspicion. If that were 
allowed, the Fourth Amendment would be meaningless. The 
roadblock in this case fails to pass the balancing test employed 
in Sitz. Consequently, the roadblock stop violated the Fourth 
Amendment. The evidence seized from petitioner's vehicle as a 
result of that stop must be ordered suppressed. 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE STOP 
OF PETITIONER IS INADMISSIBLE UNLESS THE 
STATE SHOWS THAT ANY CONSENT WAS NOT OBTAINED 
THROUGH THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ILLEGAL STOP. 
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)
 r this 
court reversed the Court of Appeals1 holding that a voluntary 
consent in and of itself alleviates the taint of a prior illegal 
23 
stop or search. This court held that there must be a two part 
analysis to determine the legal effect of a consent following an 
unlawful stop. First, there must be a voluntary consent. 
Second, the consent must not have been obtained through police 
exploitation of the primary or antecedent police illegality. To 
be admissible, the State must show the evidence was obtained by 
means sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal stop to be 
purged of the primary taint. 
23 
See State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1989, revised 796 
P.2d 684 (Utah, 1990). 
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This court went on to note in Arroyo that the basis of 
the second part of this analysis is found in the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United 
States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). With respect to the manner in which 
this doctrine related to consent searchesr the court stated, "The 
'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to 
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are 
nonetheless the exploitation of a prior illegality." 796 P.2d at 
690. The court then cited with approval cases that reached that 
same conclusion. 
The legal authority for the lower court's decision in 
Arroyo was the Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Carson, 793 
F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, den. 479 U.S. 914 (1986). However, 
this court found that the decision in Carson failed to provide 
adequate protections to Fourth Amendment interests, stating, 
"Police should not be permitted to ratify their own illegal 
conduct by merely obtaining a consent after the illegality has 
occurred." Ld. at 689. It was then found that the Carson rule 
failed to effectuate either of the two purposes of the 
exclusionary rule. First, police are not deterred for violating 
the Fourth Amendment. Second, the courts were made a party to 
the prior illegal conduct of the police officers. This court 
found that the Carson rule simply ignored the police illegality. 
To analyze the exploitation of the primary illegality 
this court indicated that the test from Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590 (1975), should be followed. In that case the Court held 
that a confession was the fruit of a prior illegal arrest. The 
factors that were considered by the Court in reaching this 
conclusion were the "temporal proximity of the arrest and the 
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances [and] the 
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct•" 422 U.S. at 
603-604. 
In applying the factors described in Brown v. Illinoisy 
supra, to a consent search, a number of circumstances have been 
discussed in the case law. With respect to the temporal 
proximity of the unlawful detention to the consent, the courts 
have generally held that when the consent is closely related in 
time to the detention, the taint of the detention remains. 
United States v. Delquadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); C.f. 
Juarez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
Intervening circumstances have been found to include 
release from custody, an appearance before the magistrate, 
discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated 
charge, United States v. Delqadillo-Velasquez, supra. Other 
intervening circumstances that may establish sufficient 
attenuation between the unlawful detention and the voluntary 
consent have been described in the case law: giving of the 
Miranda warning and allowing the defendant to consult with a 
passenger, United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983), 
Juarez v, State, supra, telling the defendant that he did not 
have to consent to the search, Reyes v. State, 741 S.W.2d 414 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987), developing probable cause from 
independent sources to justify the detention United State v. 
Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986), and whether the consent was 
volunteered or requested, People v. Borqes, 69 N.Y.2d 1031, 511 
N.E.2d 58 (1987). 
Circumstances relating to the purpose or flagrancy of 
the violation have included: the use of firearms to effect the 
arrest, People v. Odom, 83 111. App. 3d 1022, 404 N.E.2d 997 
(1980); a manner of arrest or detention that causes confusion, 
surprise or fright, United States v. Delquadillo-Velasquez, 
supra: a complete lack of suspicion or information about criminal 
activity by the defendant, United States v. Thompson, supra. 
State v. Zielman, 384 So.2d 359 (La. 1980); the circumstances of 
the detention reflect that officers were on an expedition to find 
evidence, Reyes v. State, supra: or the use of threats or 
physical force, United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 
(9th Cir. 1980). 
In the instant case, the purported consent occurred 
during the unlawful detention. There were no intervening 
circumstances between the detention and the consent. Finally, 
the actions of the officers were purposeful and flagrant in 
relation to the Fourth Amendment violation. Petitioner was 
stopped on Interstate 15 at a roadblock. (R. 153) The lack of 
legal authority to engage in such a procedure has previously been 
discussed. Likewise, troopers had unlimited discretion in how 
the roadblock would be conducted. After appellant was stopped, 
Trooper Howard requested that petitioner produce his driver's 
license and vehicle registration. (R. 154) The registration 
indicated the vehicle belonged to petitioner's wife (R. 154) and 
the driver's license was from Georgia. (R. 154) The trooper 
confronted petitioner about these matters and also about the odor 
of alcohol that petitioner had about him. (R. 155) The trooper 
then asked petitioner if he was in possession of any alcohol, 
firearms or drugs. Petitioner then produced an open bottle of 
liquor. (R. 155) The trooper ordered petitioner out of the 
vehicle and requested his consent to search the vehicle. (R. 
156) Petitioner acquiesced to that request. (R. 156) 
As can be seen, any consent given was inseparable from 
the unlawful detention. There was no substantial passage of time 
to allow petitioner to reflect on whether or not he would grant 
his consent to search. There were no intervening circumstances 
that would eliminate the taint of the continuing detention. The 
stated purpose of the roadblock was to discover evidence of 
criminal violations. The procedures used in conducting the 
roadblock did nothing to dissipate fear or confusion on the part 
of petitioner. Finally, the questioning during the detention 
took on an accusatory nature. Petitioner and the passenger were 
ordered out of the vehicle and petitioner merely acquiesced to 
24 
See: Points II and III, supra. 
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the request to search the vehicle. Any consent given by 
petitioner was obtained as a result of the exploitation of the 
initial unlawful detention. The evidence seized is the fruit of 
that initial detention and must be ordered suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The exclusionary rule of Article If Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution should apply to illegal drug stamp tax 
proceedings before the State Tax Commission. The roadblock stop 
of petitioner's vehicle violated both Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Any consent that was obtained from 
petitioner to allow his vehicle to be searched was gained through 
the exploitation of this illegal roadblock. The evidence seized 
as a result of the stop and search of petitioner's vehicle should 
not have been introduced in the illegal drug tax stamp 
proceedings before the state tax commission* The decision of the 
tax commission should be reversed and a new hearing ordered 
without the use of the evidence seized from the search of 
petitioner's vehicle. 
DATED this day of December, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of December, 
1990, I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to John McCarrey, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
ADDENDUM 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
LOUIE E. SIMS, ) 
Petitioner, ) 
: FINDINGS OF FACT, 
v. ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: AND FINAL DECISION 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE ) 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : Appeal No. 88-2547 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on February 13, 1990. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and in behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner was G. 
Fred Metos, Attorney at Law. Present and representing the 
Respondent was L. A. Dever, Assistant Attorney General. 
Based upon the memoranda submitted and oral arguments 
of the parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is the illegal drug stamp tax. 
2, The date in question is July 27, 1988. 
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3. As a result of a search conducted of the motor 
vehicle driven by the Petitioner, members of the Juab County 
Sheriffs Office and Utah Highway Patrol seized 15 grams of 
marijuana and 985 grams of cocaine. 
4. No drug stamps were affixed to the controlled 
substances. 
5. A tax deficiency in the amount of $197,053 and a 
penalty in an equal amount were assessed for the failure to 
have the required drug stamps affixed to the controlled 
substances. 
6. As a result of criminal charges arising out of 
the possession of the controlled substances, the District Court 
ruled that the search of the Petitioner's vehicle was lawful. 
7. Individuals who purchase the drug stamps are not 
required to identify themselves by name, social security 
number, nor address when purchasing the stamps. 
8. No evidence was presented which would indicate 
that the information obtained from the individuals purchasing 
the drug stamps is provided to law enforcement agencies. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A tax of $3.50 per gram of marijuana and a tax upon 
cocaine at $200 per gram is imposed pursuant to the Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act. (Utah Code Ann. §59-19-103.) 
The evidence of tax paid is a stamp affixed to the 
controlled substance. (Utah Code Ann. §59-19-104.) 
Failure to affix the stamp shall result in the 
assessment of a tax plus a 100% civil penalty. (Utah Code Ann. 
-2-
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S59-19-106.) 
The Tax Commission is not a judicial body established 
under the Constitution of the State of Utah, nor is it 
empowered nor authorized to determine the legality or 
constitutionality of legislative enactments. (Shay v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 120 P.2d 274 (Utah 1941); State Tax 
Commission v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979); and Belco 
Petroleum Corporation v. State Board of Equalization, 587 P.2d 
204 (Wyoming 1978). 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The Petitioner has presented four issues to be decided 
by the Commission: 
1. Does the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act violate the 
Petitioner's right against self-incrimination? 
2. Does the Exclusionary Rule apply in proceedings 
before the Tax Commission? 
3. Does the assessment of taxes under the Act 
violate the Petitioner's right to procedural due process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution? 
4. Is the Act void because it is impermissibly vague 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
Taking the above listed issues in reverse order, the 
Tax Commission finds that with respect to issue numbers 3 and 
4, the Tax Commission is not a court of law empowered to 
-3-
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determine the constitutionality of the statute- Therefore, the 
Tax Commission must assume the constitutional validity of the 
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, 
With respect to the first issue, the Utah Court of 
Appeals in the case of State of Utah v. Davis, (case number 
89-0009-CA, Court of Appeals, February 17, 1990) directly 
addressed the issue of whether the Act violated a person's 
right against self-incrimination. The Court of Appeals held 
that it did not. 
The Court found that by construing the Act to prohibit 
the use of any information gained as a result of a purchaser's 
compliance with the Act to establish a link in the chain of 
evidence in a subsequent drug prosecution provides the same 
protections provided by the Fifth Amendment, thus upholding the 
Acts constitutionality. In the present case, there was no 
showing that any information obtained by the Tax Commission 
regarding the purchase of the drug stamps was provided to law 
enforcement agencies or became a link in the chain of evidence 
in subsequent criminal proceedings. 
The remaining issue, the applicability of the 
Exclusionary Rule to proceedings before the Tax Commission, is 
one of first impression. 
In holding that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply 
in proceedings before this body, the Tax Commission adopts the 
balancing test set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 
cases of United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) and INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). That test requires the 
weighing of the benefits in deterring unlawful police conduct 
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against the loss of probative evidence and the secondary costs 
that flow from the less accurate adjudication that therefore 
occurrs. 
The primary purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to 
deter unlawful police conduct. There is no showing^that 
application of the Exclusionary Rule in Tax Commission 
proceedings would serve to meet that purpose. Additionally, if 
the Tax Commission were to apply the Exclusionary Rule in its 
proceedings, inconsistent results could be found between those 
hearings and criminal proceedings in the District Court. 
Therefore, the societal interest in deterring police conduct in 
these cases does not outweigh the societal interests in 
facilitating the accuracy of the fact finding process in these 
hearings. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that the determination of the Collection Division's assessment 
against the Petitioner for tax and penalties per the Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act is affirmed. It is so ordered. 
DATED this ^)Q day of <>yUrtJL_^ . 1990. 
BY/dRpE»y5S JHE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Z£>6 B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
ABSENT 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have ten (10) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Cour 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
PFI/sld/9210w 
Appeal No. 88-2547 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of-the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Louie E. Sims 
c/o G. Fred Metos 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Richard Strong 
Director, Collections 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Sam Vong 
Operations, Central Files 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Lee Dever 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
DATED this pj\ day of "^SJJAX , 1990. 
£VYM 
Secretary 
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